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ORIGINALISM AND PARKING TICKETS 
 
Lawrence Rosenthal* 
Originalism – the view that constitutional provisions should be interpreted as they 
were “understood at the time of the law’s enactment”1 – is ascendant.  Originalist 
methodology now proliferates throughout constitutional law.  In one area of constitutional 
jurisprudence, however, originalism is nearly entirely absent.  The Constitution twice forbids 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but originalists cannot 
develop an account of what type of process was considered “due” at the time of the framing.  
That omission, I will argue, has important implications for originalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, an inquiry into the original understanding of due 
process suggests that the original meaning of this constitutional provision – and perhaps 
many others – is nonoriginalist. 
The discussion below unfolds in four parts.  Part I surveys the rise of public-meaning 
originalism – the view that constitutional provisions should be construed in light of their 
generally understood meaning at the time of their enactment – and its effort to anchor 
constitutional interpretation in historical analysis by interpreting open-ended constitutional 
provisions in light of the legal rights that were commonly recognized at the time of the 
framing.  Part II then applies public-meaning originalism to arguments about the 
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1 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 
(1991).  This definition will suffice for purposes of the present project, but I do not mean to overlook the many 
differences among originalists.  For a particularly helpful discussion of the various flavors of originalism, see 
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1811-15 (1996).  Nonoriginalism also can 
have a variety of meanings, but for my purposes, that term will denote a method of constitutional 
interpretation that does not privilege legal arrangements and understandings at the time of the framing and 
ratification of a constitutional provision. 
2constitutionality of procedural innovation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
Due Process Clauses.  It begins by considering a specific type of procedural innovation – 
municipal systems for the administrative adjudication of parking tickets.  Part II describes 
these systems of administrative adjudication, and then demonstrates their incompatibility 
with an originalist view of the Due Process Clause.  Part II concludes by observing that an 
originalist view of procedural due process would necessarily condemn any innovation in civil 
or criminal procedure that would infringe upon procedural rights recognized at the framing.  
Next, Part III considers whether due process is properly understood, even on originalist 
terms, as a prohibition on procedural innovation.  Part III observes that the original 
understanding of due process was remarkably diffuse; and concludes that the Due Process 
Clause was not framed in originalist terms – it is best understood as a mandate for the courts 
to evolve a common law governing the manner in which persons may be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, rather than leaving that question to the mercies of majoritarian 
institutions.  Finally, Part IV acknowledges that there are reasons for restraint when 
construing the Due Process Clause, but they are prudential in character, and not rooted in 
the original meaning of due process.   
I.  THE RISE OF PUBLIC-MEANING ORIGINALISM 
Originalism has enjoyed a reversal of fortune.  A generation ago, when the United 
States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause,2 originalism’s only appearance came in then-Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, which argued that the Court’s construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was surely in error because its Framers did not intend to recognize 
 
2 “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ,” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
3a right to abortion.3 That method of constitutional interpretation was evidently thought to 
be so implausible that it was not deemed worthy of comment by any other member of the 
Court.4 Today, in contrast, two members of the Court are avowed originalists,5 and at their 
confirmation hearings, the two most recent additions to the Court evinced considerable 
sympathy with originalist interpretation.6 Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation 
are also increasingly appearing in majority opinions.7 Originalism, for example, has 
revolutionalized much of constitutional criminal procedure;8 originalist methodology has led 
the Court to overhaul its jurisprudence regarding the role of judges in sentencing,9 and the 
right of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against them.10 In the due process 
arena, the Court’s opinions increasingly stress that substantive rights are unlikely to be 
 
3 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174-77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  On Justice (later Chief 
Justice) Rehnquist’s brand of originalism, see Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional 
Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 557 (1994); Richard W. Garnett, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Enduring, Democratic 
Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2006); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 
TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).  
4 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-64 (1973); id. at 167-71 (Stewart, J., concurring);  Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 207-08 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 210-18 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 221-
22 (White, J., dissenting).  Moreover, Justice White, the other dissenting vote, had earlier embraced a decidedly 
nonoriginalist approach to the Due Process Clause in recognizing a constitutional right to contraception, at 
least in the context of marriage.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-07 (1965) (White, J., 
concurring).   
5 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Clarence Thomas, 
Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996).  See also, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358-59 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  
 6 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the Sen. Jud. Comm., 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, 570 (2005); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Jud. 
Comm., 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 357 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 997-1005 (2006); McCreary 
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742-45 (2005); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 200-04 (2003); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474-77 (2002).  
8 For an empirical inquiry into the impact of originalism on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
criminal cases, see Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. ___ (2006) (forthcoming).   
9 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).   On 
the significance of these cases, see, e.g., Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle?: Judicial Discretion Revived in 
Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615 (2006); J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Jury Decision Making after 
the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301 
10 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004).  On the impact of Crawford, see, e.g., John 
C. Latimer, Confrontation after Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on How Hearsay Is Analyzed under the Confrontation 
Clause, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 327 (2006); Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the 
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005).  
4protected by due process unless they are rooted in historical understandings,11 although the 
Court still occasionally embraces nonoriginalist approaches to substantive due process.12 In 
the academy, the rise of originalism has been even more dramatic.  As Professor Barnett has 
observed, until recently, “the received wisdom among law professors [wa]s that originalism 
was dead, having been defeated in intellectual combat sometime in the early eighties,”13 but 
by the dawn of the millennium, originalism had become “the prevailing approach to 
constitutional interpretation.”14
The explanation for this shift is not difficult to discern.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
advocates of originalism advanced a form of intentionalism; they argued that the 
Constitution should be construed according to the intentions of those who framed its text.15
This original-intention method was met with two powerful objections.  First, the difficulties 
of ascertaining the intentions of the multitudes involved in the framing and ratification of 
constitutional provisions – who often held disparate or even contradictory views about these 
provisions – were formidable.16 Second, there was considerable evidence that the 
 
11 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
302-03 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125-28 (1992);  
12 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
13 Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611 (1999).  
 14 Id. at 613.  Accord, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 68 (1996); 
Martin S. Flaherty, The Better Angels of Self-Government, 71 FORD. L. REV. 1773, 1774 (2003); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Century, 24 MELB. U.L. REV. 677, 695-97 (2000); Cass Sunstein, Book 
Review: Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 558 (1997). 
15 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977); Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13-21 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Edwin Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988). 
16 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUSANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 14-25 (2002); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 284-398 (1988); Robert Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456-74 (1984); Boris I. Biitker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers 
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 30-36 (1995); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209-22 (1980); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of 
the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through 
History (Or To It), 65 FORD. L. REV. 1587 (1997); Marc V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretation and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-804 (1983). 
5Constitution’s framers believed that legal texts should be construed without regard to the 
underlying intentions of the drafters.17 Although there were a number of efforts to rebut 
these attacks,18 by the 1990s originalists had largely acknowledged the force of these 
objections and embraced the view that the Constitution should be construed in light of the 
generally understood meaning of its text at the time it was adopted rather than by reference 
to the likely intentions of the drafters or ratifiers.19 The case for this public-meaning 
originalism is perhaps best summarized by its most prominent advocate, Justice Scalia: 
The most prominent defect of nonoriginalism . . . is its incompatibility with 
the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality . . . . [T]he 
Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of 
“law” that is the business of the courts – an enactment that has a fixed meaning 
ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law.  If the 
Constitution were not that sort of a “law,” but a novel invitation to apply current 
societal values, what reason would there be to believe that the invitation was 
addressed to the courts rather than the legislature.  One simply cannot say, regarding 
that sort of novel enactment, that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department” to determine its content.  Quite to the contrary, the legislature 
would seem a much more appropriate expositor of social values, and its 
 
17 See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 340-65 (1996); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 
TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1006-62 (1991); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
18 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 88-99, 106-09 (1999); Raoul Berger, The Founders’ Views --  
According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence To Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 226, 236-84 (1988); Charles A, 
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONSTIT. COMMENT. 77 (1988); Earl Maltz, The Failure of 
Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONSTIT. COMMENT. 43 (1987); William J. Michael, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 201 (2000). 
19 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 92-117 (2004); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY 67-90 (1992); BORK, supra note 1, at 143-51; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 19-31 (1985); WHITTINGTON, supra note 18, at 160-212; MICHAEL J. 
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS 28-53 (1994); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
cited as “A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION”]; Baade, supra note 17, at 1103-07; Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and 
the ‘Black Ink’ of the Framers’ Intention, 109 HARV. L. REV. 751, 756-60 (1987); Mark D. Greenberg & Harry 
Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998); Kay, supra note 18, 229-36; Gary Lawson, On 
Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1988); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment 
on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1268 (1997); Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONSTIT. COMMENT. 529 (1998); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the 
View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507 (1988). 
6determination that a statute is compatible with the Constitution should, as in 
England, prevail.20 
Thus, although Justice Scalia acknowledges that “it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb 
the original understanding of an ancient text,”21 he nevertheless endorses originalism because 
it minimizes “the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . that the 
judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”22 
The appeal of originalism is hard to deny.  As originalists point out, the point of a 
written constitution seems to inhere in creating fixed rules that are enforceable as positive 
law and supreme because they achieved supermajority support at the time of adoption, 
whereas Great Britain’s common law constitution posed little obstacle to its use of practices 
that the colonists regarded as both tyrannical and unconstitutional.23 To use Justice Scalia’s 
words, treating the Constitution as an evolving statement of aspirations “is a preeminently 
common-law way of making law, and not the way of construing a democratically adopted 
text.”24 He acknowledges that the Constitution contains much that is “abstract and general 
rather than specific and concrete,” but adds that “[t]he context suggests that the abstract and 
general terms, like the concrete and particular ones, are meant to nail down current rights, 
rather than aspire to future ones – that they are abstract and general references to extant 
rights and freedoms possessed under the then-current regime.” 25 This approach, 
accordingly, restrains judicial decisionmaking by linking constitutional protection to those 
 
20 Scalia, supra note 5, at 854 (brackets in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 
137, 177 (1803)).  He adds:  “I take the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously, and even if one assumes (as 
many nonoriginalists do not even bother to do) that the Constitution was originally meant to expound evolving 
rather than permanent values, . . . I see no basis for believing that supervision of the evolution would have been 
committed to the courts.”  Id. at 862. 
21 Id. at 856.  
22 Id. at 863.  
 23 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 19, at 100-09; BASSHAM, supra note 19, at 92-94; PERRY, supra note 
19, at 31-38; WHITTINGTON, supra  note 18, at 50-61; Kay, supra note 18, at 289-92. 
 24 Scalia, supra note 19, at 40. 
25 Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 135 (emphasis in 
original).  
7rights recognized at the time of the framing – as Akhil Amar has put it, Justice Scalia’s 
originalism is “frozen in 1791 or 1868 amber.”26 Still, as James Ryan recently observed, “a 
compelling and popular alternative theory has yet to emerge from the academy or sitting 
judges as an alternative to originalism.”27
To be sure, public-meaning originalism has its critics.  Nonoriginalists deny that 
rebranded originalism can overcome the difficulties with ascertaining original meaning and 
they question the legitimacy and utility of shackling constitutional law to the wishes of the 
dead hands that drafted constitutional texts and embraced their original meaning long ago.28
Still, nonoriginalists have yet to respond effectively to the central originalist argument – it is 
difficult to understand why one would adopt a constitutional text if not to memorialize its 
then-understood meaning as organic law.29 It is on this point that I mean to open a new line 
of attack.  To do so, I will focus on the inability of the originalist camp to develop an 
originalist account of procedural due process.  That inability has important implications for 
the power of originalist methods of interpretation. 
 
26 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 818 (1994).  
27 James E. Ryan, Does It Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1623, 1625 (2006).  
28 For a sampling of the literature responding to originalism’s turn toward original meaning, see, e.g.,
STEPHEN G. BREYER: ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115- 32 (2005); 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 290-305 (1996); 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISENGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 10-45 (2001); RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13-25 (2001); JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE 
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99-124 (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:
WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 53-78 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating 
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); Barry 
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); Daniel S. Goldberg, And 
the Walls Came Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism and Originalism, 39 
HOUS. L. REV. 463 (2002); Philip C. Kissam, Triangulating Constitutional Theory: Power, Time, and Everyman, 53 
BUFF. L. REV. 269 (2005); Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through It, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1627 (1997); 
William G. Michael, When Originalism Fails, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 497 (2004); Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court 
and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612 (2006); Robert L. Tsai, Democracy’s Handmaid, 60 B.U. L. REV.
1 (2006); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Law, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002).  
29 For a particularly powerful statement of this view, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the 
Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998).  
8The debate over originalism generally discusses the Constitution as an 
undifferentiated whole, but not all constitutional provisions are equally amenable to an 
originalist construction.  The Seventh Amendment, for example, provides:  “[I]n suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved . . . .”30 This formulation virtually compels an inquiry into the nature 
of the common-law right to a jury trial at the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified.  In 
fact, the Supreme Court has construed the Seventh Amendment in just this originalist 
fashion.31 Other constitutional provisions employ legal terms of art, such as the prohibition 
on Ex Post Facto Laws32 or Bills of Attainder.33 It is difficult to construe these provisions 
with integrity except by reference to their meaning at the time they were added to the 
Constitution.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has taken an originalist approach 
to these provisions as well.34 The case for an originalist interpretation for more broadly 
phrased constitutional provisions – such as the Due Process Clause – is, however, far less 
clear.  
It seems to have gone without notice that when it comes to the procedural rights 
secured by due process, originalist methods of interpretation are absent.  The Supreme 
Court’s work in that area – even when written by the Court’s originalists – breathes not a 
word about originalism.35  Consider the recent decision in Jones v. Flowers,36 in which the 
Court held that when a notice of tax foreclosure sale of a residence sent to the taxpayer’s last 
 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  
31 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999); Feltner 
v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-52 (1998); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1989); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U.S. 531, 533-34 (1970). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.  
34 See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611-15 (2003) (Ex Post Facto Clause);  Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-75 (1977) (Bill of Attainder Clause).  
35 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 
209 (2005); Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2003);  
36 126 U.S. 1708 (2006).  
9known address by certified mail is returned unclaimed, due process requires the taxing 
authority to provide some additional form of notice before proceeding with the 
foreclosure.37 The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Thomas, one of the Court’s 
avowed originalists, and was joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, but its approach is 
nonoriginalist; the dissent merely contended that the measures undertaken to supply notice 
to the taxpayer were reasonable under the circumstances.38 In particular, the dissenting 
opinion made no reference to the procedures for giving notice in place in 1868, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.39 Indeed, we will see that service by mail was 
considered ineffective in 1868,40 but no member of the Court made anything of that fact.  
The failure to develop an originalist position on procedural due process is equally apparent 
among the academic expositors of originalism; I can identify no effort in the scholarly 
literature to develop an originalist account of procedural due process.41 
This omission is perhaps unsurprising – procedural due process poses serious 
problems for originalism.  The objections to the view that civil and criminal procedure are 
frozen in eighteenth or nineteenth century amber are more than consequentialist; they are 
originalist as well.  Understanding due process to prohibit procedural innovation is 
inconsistent with longstanding legal tradition; civil and criminal procedure up to the time of 
the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses had been rife 
with innovation.  For example, criminal procedure had undergone a virtual revolution in the 
centuries before the framing, as an essentially inquisitorial system in which defense counsel 
was virtually absent evolved into something much like the adversarial system we know 
 
37 See id. at 1715-21.  
38 See id. at 1721-27 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
39 See 16 Stat. 706, 707 (1868).   
40 See Part II.B.1, infra.
41 The only possible exception of which I am aware is Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The 
Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 339 (1987).  Eberle’s account, however, fails to qualify as 
originalist, for reasons explored below.  See note 107, infra.
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today.42 Civil procedure had also evolved from the intricacies of common law pleading 
toward a more streamlined approach emphasizing substance over form.43 The constitutional 
text, moreover, does not suggest the kind of frozen-in-amber approach reflected in the 
Seventh Amendment.44 But if history is not the guide for assessing whether a procedural 
innovation supplies “due process,” then constitutional interpretation is no longer anchored 
to historical understandings; it is no longer originalist.  In this article, I explore the 
relationship between originalism and procedural due process in an effort to demonstrate that 
an originalist view of due process is untenable – I argue that the original meaning of the two 
Due Process Clauses – and perhaps much of the rest of the Constitution as well – is 
nonoriginalist. 
II. THE FAILURE OF ORIGINALIST ACCOUNTS OF PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS. 
 
To demonstrate the difficulties of an originalist approach to procedural due process, 
I begin with a particularly prosaic example – the methods by which liability for vehicular 
parking offenses are adjudicated.   The need to deal with millions of vehicles found illegally 
parked each year in the nation’s major cities has led to the emergence of an entirely new 
system of streamlined adjudication to deal with what would otherwise be a crushing volume 
of litigation.   While the innovative systems of administrative adjudication and enforcement 
of parking ticket liability that have emerged fare well under prevailing due process 
jurisprudence, they are indefensible under an originalist approach – a perhaps unsurprising 
result given the likely inability of the constitutional framers to envision the millions of 
 
42 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 284-343 (2003).  
43 For a summary of the dramatic evolution in civil procedure until and after the framing of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, see ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 12-64 (1952).  
44 The relevant historical evidence of the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and the respective due process clauses is considered in Part III.A below.  
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vehicles that now clog our largest cities.  Generalizing from this example, I then consider the 
implications of an originalist jurisprudence for procedural innovation. 
A.  Procedural Innovation in Parking Ticket Adjudication. 
State law usually delegates to municipalities the power to regulate the parking of 
vehicles by municipal ordinance.45 The rationale for delegation should be obvious; the need 
for regulation will vary with the size and density of the municipality.  In a congested 
municipality, a lack of effective parking regulation can have an enormous impact on the 
quality of commercial and residential life.46
1.  Characteristics of parking-enforcement reforms – Enforcing parking regulations poses 
logistical difficulties not ordinarily present in ordinance-enforcement litigation.  The first 
involves service.  Personal service is rarely practicable; parking enforcement officials who 
observe an illegally parked car can hardly be expected to stake it out until the operator 
returns.  Accordingly, state law generally authorizes a form of “tie-on” service – service of a 
 
45 See ALA. CODE § 32-5-1(e) (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 28.01.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-
627(A)(1) (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. §27-49-106(b)(1) (2006); CAL. VEH. CODE § 21100 (2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 42-4-111(1)(a) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-307(a) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 501 (2006); 
FLA. STAT. §316.008(1)(a) (2006); GA.CODE ANN. §40-6-371(a)(1) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291C-111(a) 
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-208(1)(a) (2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-208(a)(1) (2005); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 9-21-1-3(a)(1) (2006); IOWA CODE § 321-236(1) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2002(a)(1) (2006); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.390(5)(c) (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:41(A)(1) (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
30A, § 3001 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 25-102(a)(1) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 90, § 20A (2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 257.606(1)(a) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 169.04(a)(1) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-3-
211(a)(1) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 49.266(1) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-12-101(1) (2005); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 60-680(1)(a) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.777 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:70 
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-197.2 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. §66-7-9(A)(1) (2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §
1640(a)(1) (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-50 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4511.07(A) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §15-102(a)(1) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 810.010 (2006) ; 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6109(a)(1) (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-12(a)(1) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-710(1) 
(2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 9-31-1 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-61 (2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §
542.202(a)(2) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-208(1)(a) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2201 (2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-1220 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.575 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-2-
8(a)(1) (2006); WIS. STAT. § 346.50 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-109(a)(i) (2006). 
46 See, e.g., Jacquielynn Floyd, Ticket Masters; Parking Officers Learn to Stay Cool as Drivers Fume, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1998, at 1A.  The survey that follows is confined to state statutes even though 
parking is also subject to local regulation.  Due to the difficulty of undertaking a comprehensive survey of 
municipal ordinances, no effort has been made along those lines, but the reader can assume that in many 
localities, regulations similar to those discussed below have been adopted by ordinance even when not 
specifically authorized by applicable state statute, either pursuant to some general delegation of regulatory 
authority of as an incident of home-rule authority. 
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parking ticket is accomplished by leaving a copy on the vehicle.47 Another copy may be 
served by mail on the address of the registered owner identified in state records.48 For 
similar reasons, the registered owner of the vehicle is usually deemed prima facie responsible 
when the vehicle is unlawfully parked. 49 
Additional logistical problems face the adjudicative process.  These difficulties are 
largely a function of staggering volume.  For example, in 1988, shortly before Chicago 
turned to administrative adjudication, the police issued 4.2 million parking tickets.50
Handling a caseload that large is a considerable challenge; enormous judicial resources are 
required to handle that many cases.  But that is not the only logistical problem that large 
municipalities face, as Chicago’s experience illustrates.  In 1988, just prior to the introduction 
of administrative adjudication of parking tickets, among contested cases, guilty findings 
issued in 7,381 cases, while 127,849 cases were either not prosecuted or the violator was 
discharged.51 The primary reason for the dismal conviction rate was that judges would insist 
that the ticketing official testify and on the frequent occasions on which the ticketing official 
did not appear, the ticket would be dismissed.52 Yet testimony from the ticketing official is 
likely to be useless; given the volume of parking tickets, the only truthful testimony a 
 
47 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40202 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-10 (S)(3) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. §
291C-167 (2005); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-208.3(b)(3) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2113 (2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 82.610 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 26-302 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 90, § 20A 
(2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-23-19 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 300.585 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-139.4 
(2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 238 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-302 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4521.03 (2006).   
48 See ALASKA STAT. § 28.05.121 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-885 (2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT 
5/11-208.3(b)(5)(i) (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 153.820 (2006).  
49 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §40215 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. §7-152B (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
21, § 4181 (D) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1967 (2005) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2114 (2005) ; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13 :2571 (2006) ; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 26-302 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 90, § 20A (2005); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 257.675A (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-23-19 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
231:132-a (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-139.8 (2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 239 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4521.03 (2006). 
50 William Recktenwald, City writes more tickets, but few pay, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1989, at 1.  
51 Id.. See also, e.g.. Raphael Lewis, Traffic Tickets Beaten on Appeal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2000, at 
B1. 
52 Rogers Worthington, Scofflaw trackdown going flat fast in city, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1986, at 1. 
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ticketing official is likely to be able to provide is that he has no recollection of issuing the 
ticket but presumes that the information recorded on the ticket is accurate.53
To avoid the inefficiencies associated with the judicial process, Chicago sought and 
obtained a new state statute authorizing its use of administrative adjudication for parking 
violation.54 This is reflective of a general trend toward nontraditional forms of adjudication 
for parking-ticket litigation.55 Indeed, state statutes authorizing municipalities to run their 
own systems of administrative adjudication for parking violations are increasingly common.56
Under these systems of administrative adjudication, the formal rules of evidence applicable 
to judicial proceedings usually do not apply,57 and the parking ticket itself is often treated as 
prima facie evidence of liability.58
53 See, e.g., Ed Will, That's the Ticket Excuses Start in the Referees' Court, DENVER POST, Oct. 1, 1997, at 
G-01.   
54 See James M. Reilly, The Department of Administrative Hearings for the City of Chicago: A New Method of 
Municipal Code Enforcement, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 89 (1998).  
55 See, e.g., John J. Lipinski, Alternative dispute resolution for traffic cases, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., April 27, 
1992, at 6; Julie Mason, Parking Citation Changes – Just the Ticket?, Houston Chronicle, Jan. 24, 1995, at A-11; 
Rick McDonough, Louisville Gets Tough on Parking Tickets; New Civil Court Tactics include Garnished Wages and Liens, 
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Feb. 15, 1999, at 01A; Brian McGrory, Plan Emerges to Free Courts of Ticket 
Load; Shift to Municipalities Offers Solution, Some Say, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1989, at 17. 
56 See ALASKA STAT. § 28.05.141 (2006); CAL. VEH. CODE § 40215 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-
152b (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 807 (2006); FLA. STAT. §316.008 (2) (2005); GA.CODE ANN. § 40-13-50 
(2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-208.3(a) (2005); IOWA CODE § 805.13 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 805.13 
(2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:2571 (2006) (for municipalities with populations over 100,000); MASS. GEN.
LAWS CH. 90, § 20A (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 479.011(1) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39 :5-2 (2006); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 235 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-175 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 153.820 (2006) (for 
municipalities with populations over 500,000); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-41.1-6 
(2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §1-23-380 (2005); TEX. TRANSP. CODe ANN. § 682.003 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23, § 1742 (2006) (for municipalities with populations over 1,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-104 (2006); WIS.
STAT. § 345.28 (2006).   
57 See 625 ILL. COMP. STATt. § 11-208.3(b)(4) (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:2571(D) (2006); 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 240 (2)(c) (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 153.820 (2006) (Multnomah County); 2 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 554 (2005).   
58 See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40215 (c)(5) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-152b(e) (2006); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 21, § 712 (2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-208.3(b)(3) (2005); IOWA CODE § 805.13 (2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 805.13 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 26-303 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 
20A (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 257.675a (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 479.011 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:4-139.4 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-131 (2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 238 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4521.03 (D) (2006); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 682.006 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 1106 (2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 10.1-104 (2006); WIS. STAT. §345.28 (2006). 
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The final set of logistical problems relate to the enforcement of judgments.  Because 
parking fines are generally small, it is frequently not cost-effective to undertake traditional 
collection efforts.  But if the public comes to realize that parking fines are rarely collected, 
the entire regulatory system will eventually collapse.59 Again, Chicago’s experience is 
illustrative; in 1988, while 4.2 million parking tickets issued, 3.5 million summonses also 
issued because outstanding tickets had not been paid.60 And, of course, the summonses ate 
up additional resources as they must be served, and the violator must then somehow be 
induced to cough up the outstanding fine.  As a result, municipalities have turned to novel 
“self-help” enforcement measures.  Statutory reforms have authorized municipalities to 
immobilize or “boot,” and subsequently tow and impound vehicles that have accumulated a 
specified number of unpaid parking tickets.61 The owner’s driver’s license or vehicle 
registration may be suspended as well.62 Booting in particular has vastly improved the rate at 
which municipalities collect parking fines.63 
59 See, e.g., Rick McDonough, Louisville Gets Tough on Parking Tickets; New Civil Court Tactics include 
Garnished Wages and Liens, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Feb. 15, 1999, at 01A.  
60 William Recktenwald, City writes more tickets, but few pay, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1989, at 1.  
61 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651.7 (2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.3(c) (2005); Md. 
Code Ann., Transp. § 27-111 (2006) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 90, § 20A (2005) (for five or more unpaid parking 
violations); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-12-12 (2006) (for five or more notices of violations in a calendar year); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46.2-1216 (2006) (for three or more unpaid parking violations); WIS. STAT. § 349.137 
(2006). 
62 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODe § 4760 (2006); IDAHO CODE §49-326 (2006); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/6-306.5 (2005) (for ten or more unpaid parking violations); IOWA CODE § 321.40 (2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 32:393 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 26-305 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 20A 
(2005) (for two or more unpaid parking violations); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 231:130-a (2006); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39 :4-139.10 (2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 235 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 39-06.1-11 (2006); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4521.10 (2006); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1379 (2005) (for six or more unpaid parking 
violations); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-49 (2006); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 682.010 (2005); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 1752 (2006); VA. CODe ANN. § 46.2-1216 (2006) (for three or more unpaid parking violations).   
63 See, e.g., Hugo Martin, Behind the Wheel; Parking Ticket Violators May Get ‘the Boot’, Traffic enforcement 
teams clamp down on drivers with five or more overdue citations who get 72 hours to pay before a vehicle is towed, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2002, California Metro at 2; Lekan Oguntoyinbo, Fined With Their Boots On; Device Helped Collect $8.5 
Million in Tickets, DET. FREE PRESS, July 3, 1996, at 3B; Sue Anne Pressley, Metropolitan Life; ‘The Boot’: The 
Ultimate Weapon in the Parking War, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1985, at D1; Fran Spielman, Scofflaws face boot at 
Midway; O’Hare Crackdown nabbed thousands with 3 unpaid tickets, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at 6.  
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2.  Constitutionality of parking-enforcement reforms – The new systems of parking 
enforcement fare reasonably well against a claim that they deprive vehicle owners of their 
property (vehicles, money, or driver’s licenses) without due process of law.64 The Due 
Process Clause is construed to require that the government provide “notice and opportunity 
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”65 For notice to be constitutionally 
sufficient, it must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”66 Accordingly, the actual receipt of notice is not constitutionally required 
as long as the means used was a reasonable one under the circumstances.67 Moreover, 
“assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the ‘interest of the 
State’ against ‘the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”68 Leaving a ticket on the vehicle that identifies the charge and the means by 
which it can be contested, and mailing an additional copy to the last known address of the 
registered owner, fares pretty well under these standards.  While owners frequently deny that 
they received tickets served in this fashion, courts pragmatically reason that whoever is 
operating a vehicle will likely apprise the owner of the ticket.69 The use of first-class mail is 
 
64 Even the temporary deprivation of the ability to use one’s vehicle is considered a deprivation of 
“property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.  See City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 
717-18 (2003) (per curiam).  The suspension of a driver’s license is also considered a deprivation of “property” 
for constitutional purposes.  See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 
(1971).  
65 Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). 
66 Id. at 1713-14 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).   
67 See Dusenberry v. United States,  534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002).  As the Court explained in Jones, “the 
failure of notice in a specific case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice; in that sense, the 
constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc.”  126 S. Ct. at 1717. 
68 Jones, 126 S. Ct. at 1715 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).  
69 See, e.g., Gross v. Carter, 265 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001-02 (W.D. Ark. 2003); Bricker v. Craven, 391 F. 
Supp. 601, 604-05 (D. Mass. 1975); Patterson v. Cronin, 650 P.2d 531, 535 (Colo. 1982).     
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also generally thought to be a reasonable means of providing actual notice.70 The 
combination of tie-on service and mail to apprise the owner of a pending action should 
therefore satisfy prevailing constitutional standards.71
As for the constitutional adequacy of the procedures for adjudicating and enforcing 
liability, they are assessed under a three-part test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.72 Under 
this test, inquiry is made into the magnitude of the private interest at stake; the likelihood of 
error inhering the adjudicative procedures and the value of additional procedural safeguards 
in reducing that error rate; and the government’s interest, including the financial and 
administrative burdens that would be imposed by requiring additional procedural 
safeguards.73 This test does not mandate formal evidentiary hearings or judicial proceedings 
prior to the issuance of enforceable judgments.   In Eldridge, for example, the Court upheld 
administrative termination of disability benefits without a pre-deprivation evidentiary hearing 
on the ground that the written medical reports on which administrators relied provided a 
sufficiently reliable basis for determination.74 The use of administrative hearings in which 
 
70 See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1718-19 (notice to owner of real property of tax foreclosure 
sale); Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988) (notice to creditors in 
probate proceedings); Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800 (1983) (notice to 
mortgagee of tax foreclosure); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982) (notice to public housing tenants of 
forcible entry and detainer actions); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962) (notice of 
condemnation proceedings); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (same); Mullane, 339 U.S. 
at 318 (notice of settlement of trust accounts).   Jones illustrates the problems that inhere in the use of registered 
mail.  When the recipient signs a receipt there is evidence that notice was actually received, but when registered 
mail is returned unclaimed the government will be on notice of non-delivery without knowing the reason.  See 
126 S. Ct. at 1718-19.  In this fashion, a defendant can defeat service by the mere expedient of refusing to claim 
a letter. 
71 As the court put it in Saukstelis v. City of Chicago, 932 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1991), in which the 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the booting of vehicles that had accumulated more than 10 unpaid 
parking tickets, the court held “[t]his cascade of notices and opportunities for hearing is quite sufficient under 
the due process clause.”  Id. at 1173.   Accord, e.g., Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272, 1279 (6th Cir. 
1988); Rackley v. City of New York, 186 F. Supp. 2d 466, 480-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Jaouad v. City of New York, 
4 F. Supp. 2d 311, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Morris v. City of New York Parking Violations Bureau, 527 F. 
Supp. 724, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
72 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
73 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716-17 (2003) (per curiam); United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1991).  
74 See 424 U.S. at 339-49.  
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the allegations in the parking ticket is given probative weight without a right to cross-
examine the ticketing official should pass muster under this approach.  The financial stakes 
in parking ticket litigation are relatively low; the increased risk of error in relying on tickets 
rather than live testimony subject to cross-examination is also likely to be low given the 
straightforward nature of illegal parking inquiry and the low probability that ticketing 
officials’ live testimony will add anything useful; and the administrative and financial burden 
that would be imposed on the government by a rule requiring the presence of the ticketing 
officer would be great.  Thus, the cost-benefit analysis demanded by Mathews favors the new 
systems for adjudicating and enforcing parking-ticket liability.75 Indeed, courts usually 
 
75 Judge Posner has illustrated how the cost-benefit Mathews test is likely to play out in the parking 
ticket context: 
 
[T]he City issues 4 million parking tickets a year, of which 5 percent are challenged (200,000), a third 
of those appearing in person rather than by mail and thus requiring an oral hearing (67,000).  If the 
ticketing officer were required to attend, the number of hearings would undoubtedly be higher, 
because respondents would think it likely that the officer wouldn’t show up – a frequent occurrence at 
hearings on moving violations.  Suppose the number of hearings would double what it is under the 
challenged procedures (that is, would be 134,000), but the police would show up at only half, putting 
us back to 67,000; and suppose that a hearing at which an officer showed up cost him on average 2 
hours away from his other work.  Then this procedural safeguard for which the plaintiffs are 
contending would cost the City 2,000 hours a year per officer.  In addition, more hearing officers 
would be required, at some additional cost to the City, because each hearing would be longer as a 
result as a result of the presence of another live witness.  And all these are simply the monetary costs.  
Acquittals of violators due solely to the ticketing officer’s failure to appear would undermine the 
deterrent efficacy of the parking laws and deprive the City of revenues to which it was entitled as a 
matter of substantive justice. 
 
The benefits of a procedural safeguard are even trickier to estimate than the costs.  The 
benefits will depend on the harm that the safeguard will avert in cases in which it prevents an 
erroneous result and the likelihood that it will prevent and erroneous result.  We know the harm here 
to the innocent car owner found “guilty” and forced to pay a fine: it is the fine, and it can be 
anywhere from $10 to $100, for an average of $55.  We must ask how likely it is that the error would 
be averted if the ticketing officer were present at the hearing and therefore subject to cross-
examination.  Suppose that in his absence the probability of an erroneous determination that the 
respondent really did commit a parking offense is 5 percent, and the officer’s presence would cut that 
in half, to 2.5 percent.  Then the average saving to the innocent respondent would be only $1.38 ($55 
x .025) – a trivial amount. 
 
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 (7th Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1241 (1997).  Also instructive is City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003) (per curiam), in which the Court 
held that a 27-day delay in an administrative hearing following the towing of an illegally parking vehicle did not 
deprive the owner of the use of his vehicle without due process of law, reasoning that the risk of error in 
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uphold these systems utilizing the Mathews approach to procedural due process. 76 But while 
the innovations in adjudicating and enforcing parking-ticket liability fare well under current 
due process doctrine, an originalist approach to due process would lead to quite different 
results. 
B.  An Originalist Look At The New Systems of Parking-Ticket Adjudication. 
Applying the originalist view that the Due Process Clause should be construed to 
preserve procedural rights extant at the time of framing and ratification, the new systems of 
parking-ticket adjudication do not fare so well.   
1.  Service – Service of process by placing a ticket on a vehicle and mailing a copy to 
the registered owner’s address has little originalist support.  Well into the twentieth century, 
 
determinations about illegal parking is low and the administrative burden on the city in expediting the 
thousands of post-tow hearings it must conduct each year would be great.  See id. at 718-19. 
76 See, e.g., Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1350-54 (7th Cir.) (rejecting claims that use 
of a municipal administrative agency violates due process by eliminating procedural protections utilized by 
courts in criminal proceedings, eliminating a right of cross-examination, and utilizing an administrative agency 
under the control of a municipality with a financial interest in the proceedings), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241 
(1997); Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272, 1277-79 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting due process challenge 
to use of municipal administration adjudication and treatment of ticket as prima facie evidence); Jaouad v. City 
of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting claim of bias because administrative 
hearing officers are employed by city); Pempek v. Edgar, 603 F. Supp. 495, 498-500 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (upholding 
summary suspension of driver’s license when warrant issues for 10 or more unpaid parking tickets); Van 
Harken v. City of Chicago, 713 N.E. 2d 754, 762-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (rejecting due process challenge to 
ordinance establishing administrative adjudication of parking or compliance violations on the ground that 
attendance of ticketing official is not required and hearing officers are contractual employees of the city); Baker 
v. City of Iowa City, 260 N.W.2d 427, 431-32 (Iowa 1977) (rejecting challenge to booting for ten unpaid 
tickets on the ground that other measures had not proven effective to enforce parking regulations); Bane v. 
City of Boston, 396 N.E.2d 155, 156-57 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding Boston's "tow and hold" law, under 
which owner of automobile must pay outstanding parking tickets or post a bond before seeking the release of 
his car, against challenge that issuance of tickets provided insufficient predeprivation notice and opportunity 
for hearing); O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 711 A.2d 544, 547-48 (Pa.Cmwlth. Ct. 1998) (rejecting due process 
challenge to transfer of parking ticket cases from judicial to administrative adjudication).   But cf. Wilson v. City 
of New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891, 899-903 (La. 1985) (requiring the provision of notice and opportunity for 
hearing for impartial decisionmaker before vehicle is placed on boot list).  Due process attacks on the 
imposition of liability on the registered owner of a vehicle without proof that the owner had actual knowledge 
of the violation have similarly been rejected on the ground that it is proper to presume that impose the owner 
of a vehicle monitors the use of the property.  See, e.g., Gardner, 841 F.2d at 1279-80; Bricker v. Craven, 391 F. 
Supp. 601, 605 (D. Mass. 1975); City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 374 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-
91, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978), Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 104-05 (Iowa 1976); 
Commonwealth v. Minicost Car Rental, Inc., 242 N.E.2d 411, 412-13 (Mass. 1968); City of Kansas City v. 
Hertz Corp., 499 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Mo. 1973); City of Missoula v. Shea, 661 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Mont. 1983); 
City of Portland v. Kirk, 518 P.2d 665, 668 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Rudinski, 555 A.2d 931, 
933-34 (Pa. Super. 1989).  
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it was thought that a defendant could be properly haled into court only when he was 
personally served with process or if process was left at the defendant’s abode.77 In fact, the 
first state statute authorizing service by mail was not enacted until 1917,78 and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit service by registered or certified mail until 1963 and 
did not permit service by ordinary mail until 1983.79 As for the state of the law in 1868, New 
York’s Field Code, which is generally considered to be the most advanced code of procedure 
extant at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,80 required personal service in 
order to initiate legal proceedings.81 To be sure, eighteenth century jurisdictional doctrine 
considered the possibility that it might be possible to locate a defendant’s property but not 
the defendant himself; but in such cases in rem jurisdiction could be asserted over the 
property without acquiring personal jurisdiction over the defendant only if the property was 
seized and taken into the custody of the court.82 Seizure of the property was considered 
critical because “attachment combined with substituted service would provide greater 
 
77 See, e.g., 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS §§ 3-1[1] 
& [3] (1998); MILLAR, supra note 43, at 85-91.  This was the common law rule articulated by Blackstone.  See 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 279-80 (1765) (U. Chi. Press 1979).  
78 See MILLAR, supra note 43, at 88-89.  Prior to that, however, it was common to permit service on a 
former resident of the forum state who had left the jurisdiction since the events giving rise to the suit by 
publication and by mail sent to his place of residence.  See id. at 91-94.   
79 See Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal 
Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1189-1212 (1987). 
80 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 293-98 (2d ed. 2005); MILLAR,
supra note 43, at 171-80. 
81 See 1 COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK--NEW YORK FIELD CODES 1850-1865, at 254, 257-58 (1998) (§§ 621 & 628) [hereafter 
cited as “FIELD CODE”].  When the defendant could not be found and was a necessary party to litigation 
involving real property in New York, the court could authorize service by publication and by mailing a copy of 
the summons must to the defendant at his residence unless it is not know by the plaintiff and cannot be 
obtained with reasonable diligence.   See id. at 258-60 (§§ 629-31). 
82 See MILLAR, supra note 43, at 481-92.   Thus, 
 
Substituted service by publication, or in any authorized form, may be sufficient to inform the 
parities of the object of the proceedings taken where the property is once brought under the control of the court 
by seizure or some equivalent act. The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, 
in person or by agent, and it proceeds on the theory that its seizure will inform him not only that it is 
taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings authorized by law upon 
such seizure for its condemnation and sale 
 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (emphasis supplied).   
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assurance that the defendant would receive notice of the action than would substituted 
service alone.”83 It follows that tie-on service coupled with mailing would fall well short of 
what the common law considered sufficient notice at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification.   Booting and subsequent impoundment could, in contrast, be a 
permissible means of asserting in rem jurisdiction; but we have seen that booting and 
impoundment are measures undertaken to enforce an administrative judgment that 
eighteenth and nineteenth century law would deem unenforceable for lack of proper service.   
2.  Rules for adjudication – An originalist inquiry would condemn treatment of tickets as 
evidence before an administrative tribunal without need of the ticketing officer’s testimony 
and availability for cross-examination.  The nineteenth-century law of evidence recognized 
no exception to the rule against hearsay for the reports of law enforcement officials.84 Nor 
were administrative tribunals utilized as a means of adjudicating an individual’s liability; in 
the mid-nineteenth century administrative law was still in its infancy and was confined to the 
use of administrative tribunals to regulate railroads and other utilities where special expertise 
was thought to be necessary to administer a complex regulatory scheme.85 The use of 
administrative hearing officers employed by the same entity that was seeking to recover fines 
would have been thought particularly problematic.  The development of an independent 
judiciary that enjoyed tenure protection was thought to be an important aspect of the 
common law’s protection of individual rights.86 
83 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198 n.16 (1977).  In Jones, the Court reiterated the importance of 
the seizure to  the exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of personal service:  “[L]ibel of a ship, attachment of a 
chattel[ ], or entry upon real estate in the name of the law,’ -- such seiz[ures] of property . . . may reasonably be 
expected to come promptly to the owner’s attention.”  126 S. Ct. at 1178 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316)). 
84 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 101-04, 300-01.  
85 See, e.g., id. at 329-40.  By the late nineteenth century, administrative law had spread to occupational 
licensing, see id. at 340-46, still a far cry from the general use of administrative adjudication to impose liability 
for violating a generally applicable municipal laws.  
86 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77 at 257-60.  
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3. Enforcement of judgments – The use of self-help as a means of enforcing parking-
ticket liabilities is wholly indefensible on originalist terms.  In the nineteenth century, 
judgments were enforced only through judicial supervision of the enforcement process 
during which a defendant’s assets were identified and then seized pursuant to court order 
when necessary to satisfy an outstanding judgment.87 There was simply no thought of 
permitting judgment creditors to engage in self-help by immobilizing or otherwise seizing a 
judgment debtor’s property. 
Thus, the new systems of parking-ticket adjudication infringe upon any number of 
rights recognized at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was 
framed and ratified.  To be sure, one can claim the procedural innovations reflected in these 
systems with respect to service, the rules of evidence, the forum for adjudication, and the 
enforcement of the judgments do not unfairly prejudice the interests underlying nineteenth-
century procedure, but there is no method to evaluate such an argument without evaluating 
these innovations under the Mathews cost-benefit test or some other method for assessing 
the extent to which procedural innovations are thought to deprive a defendant of some 
sufficiently important procedural protection.  That would require exactly the sort of policy 
analysis of the “fairness” of a challenged statute that originalists ordinarily condemn. 
C.  Originalism and Procedural Innovation.  
Parking-ticket litigation provides what is perhaps a particularly prosaic example of 
the problems that procedural innovation poses for an originalist interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause.  The intersection of originalism and parking tickets, however, hardly 
exhausts the problems created by and originalist approach to procedural due process.  
 
87 See MILLAR, supra note 43 at 419-69.   Under the Field Code, for example, an officer of the court, 
the Sheriff, was responsible for collecting an unpaid fine and was authorized to imprison a recalcitrant 
judgment debtor, and the sheriff was himself liable to county or city for the fine unless the judgment debtor 
could not be found or had been imprisoned.  See FIELD CODE, supra note 81, at 687-88 (§§ 1667, 1648-50). 
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Applied to procedural due process, originalism would condemn virtually any effort at 
procedural innovation in order to meet the demands that contemporary litigation places on 
civil and criminal procedural.  Consider, for example, the innovations in the law of personal 
jurisdiction that have enabled the litigation process to meet the demands of our complex and 
nationalized (even internationalized) economy.   
The permissible methods of service have gradually liberalized as new technologies 
come to be seen as providing an efficient means of transmitting information and personal 
service comes to be seen as an inefficient method of initiating litigation.88 As we have seen, 
however, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing, a defendant had a right not 
to be haled into court absent personal or at least abode service, and in rem jurisdiction could 
not be exercised except over property that had been seized and brought within the custody 
and control of the court.89 Thus, under the legal rules in effect in 1868 that constitute the 
historical baseline for an originalist account of due process, there was simply no conception 
of long-arm jurisdiction or extraterritorial service effective outside of the forum state.  That 
rule, at least as a matter of constitutional law, lasted until the decision in International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington,90 which held that “due process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, he must have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”91 As a consequence of International Shoe, the Court “abandoned more 
formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s ‘presence’ in the State in favor of a more 
 
88 See generally, e.g., Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic 
Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337 (2003); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Amended Rule 4 and the Presumption of 
Jurisdiction, 14 REV. LITIG. 159 (1994); John M. Murphy, Note, From Snail Mail To E-Mail: The Steady Evolution of 
Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73 (2004).  
 89 See text at notes 77-83, supra.
90 326 U.S. 310 (1945).   
91 Id. at 316.  Accord, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1992); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, N.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 780-81 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977). 
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flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in 
the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend in that State.”92
The view at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing, however, was that a 
defendant who had not been served in the forum state had a right not be haled into that 
forum.  Indeed, within a few years of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
Pennoyer v. Neff,93 the Supreme Court held that due process forbids a state court from 
exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had not been served in the forum 
state and whose property was not seized and thereby brought within the jurisdiction of the 
forum.94 On an originalist view which measures the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections 
by reference to those rights recognized at the time of framing, accordingly, there is no 
defense for the “minimum contacts” test that supports the now-pervasive use of “long-arm” 
jurisdiction over defendants who have never set foot in the forum state.95 Such an approach 
was simply unknown in 1868. 
The view that the Due Process Clause should be construed to forbid all procedural 
innovation that deprives a litigant of a procedural right recognized at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing is so unattractive that no originalist of whom I am aware 
dares to embrace it.  It surely is strange to think of the Due Process Clause as a guarantee 
that there would never be any procedural reforms in the manner by which questions of life, 
liberty, or property were adjudicated.  Moreover, such a view is unsupported by this 
 
92 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992). 
93 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
94 See id. at 733-36.   To be sure, the Court also imported into the Due Process Clause a notion that 
states were forbidden to exercise any form of extraterritorial jurisdiction over nonresidents, see id. at 722-24, 
733-34, but we have seen that in 1868, even within a state’s borders there were well-understood restrictions on 
the permissible methods for haling a defendant into court.  Moreover, in Part III.A below  we will see that 
whatever else is true, the guarantee of due process was always thought to regulate the manner in which a 
defendant was haled into court even when the defendant resided in the forum state. 
95 For a description of the growth of long-arm statutes, see FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. 
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 74-87 (5th ed. 2001).  
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constitutional text.  Had the framers wished to freeze procedural law in amber, they would 
have used a formulation akin to that of the Seventh Amendment.  But once one agrees that 
the Due Process Clause permits procedural innovation, there are immense difficulties in 
articulating an originalist account of procedural due process.96
These difficulties are reflected in the decision in Burnham v. Superior Court.97 In that 
case, the question presented was whether due process permits a court to exercise jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant served during a transient stay in the forum state.98 Writing for 
a three-justice plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that International Shoe’s minimum contacts 
test was inapplicable to personal service within the forum state because this method of 
service was well-accepted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing.99 As he put 
it:  “[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one 
of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”100 Justice Scalia nevertheless 
defended International Shoe as a necessary response to “changes in the technology of 
transportation and communication, and to the tremendous growth of interstate business 
activity . . . .”101 In his view, 
 
96 To be sure, when the Constitution mandates a particular procedure, then there is an originalist test 
available for assessing procedural innovation.  For example, on an originalist view, the Confrontation Clause 
mandates a particular method by which evidence must be adduced in criminal cases, and procedural 
innovations must therefore be assessed with respect to their conformity with a constitutionally mandated 
procedure.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-56 (2004); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 360-65 
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-
67 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-20 (1988). The Due Process Clause, however, does not mandate 
any particular procedure; persons must only receive that process which is “due.”  Since the Due Process 
Clauses do not identify any particular procedure as constitutionally mandated, the seemingly originalist 
approach to due process, as Justice Scalia has argued, is to recognize as “due process” those procedural 
entitlements that existed at the time of framing and ratification.   See text at note 25-26, supra.
97 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  
98 See id. at 608 (plurality opinion).     
99 See id. at 610-19 (plurality opinion). 
100 Id. at 619 (plurality opinion). 
101 Id. at 617.  
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For new procedures, hitherto unknown, the Due Process Clause requires analysis to 
determine whether “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” have been 
offended.   But a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates back to the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed unquestionably meets that 
standard.102 
Thus, for Justice Scalia, due process originalism is a one-way ratchet; it permits innovation 
but shields from constitutional procedures accepted at the framing.103 
Whatever the virtues of this interpretation of the Due Process Clause; it is not 
originalist.  There is no evidence that the original understanding of due process included an 
acknowledgment that something less than the physical presence of the defendant in the 
forum state or the seizure of its property could support the exercise of jurisdiction.  To the 
contrary, as we have seen, the evidence is overwhelming that Pennoyer v. Neff correctly 
identified the prevailing understanding of the right of the nonresident defendant not to be 
haled into a jurisdiction where he was not physically present.104 Nor is there any reason to 
believe that the original understanding relaxed the requirement of physical presence when 
considerations of transportation technology and the needs of interstate commerce were at 
issue; at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption,  the mobility and importance of 
maritime commerce was presumably understood, and yet the settled rule in admiralty was 
 
102 Id. at 622 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).    
103 For example, Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can 
show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means follows 
that nothing else can be due process of law . . . .  [That which], in substance, has been immemorially 
the actual law of the land . . . therefore[e] is due process of law.  But to hold that such a characteristic 
is essential to due process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render 
it incapable of progress or improvement.  It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the 
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians. 
 
Id. at 619 (plurality opinion) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884) (brackets and ellipses 
in original).  Accord Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  For a similar articulation of procedural due process by an avowed originalist, see Michael W. 
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the 
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1286 (1997). 
 104 See text at notes 77-83, supra.
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that in the absence of personal service on a ship’s owner, a court could not exercise 
jurisdiction in an admiralty action unless the ship was seized and taken into the custody of 
the court.105 And there is no evidence that the one-way ratchet itself reflects the original 
understanding; the only authority Justice Scalia cites for his view is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hurtado v. California,106 which itself cited no historical evidence to support its own 
view of procedural innovation.107 
Even aside from all that, the one-way ratchet reflects a view that as a result of 
changes in society, the meaning of due process can change – a right not to be haled into a 
distant forum thought to be due process at the time of the framing can be eliminated if it 
comes to be viewed as sufficiently inexpedient in light of contemporary economic demands.  
That is not originalism; Justice Scalia has himself contended that if one believes that the 
Constitution’s meaning can change in light of changes in society, “there is no real difference 
between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist, except that the former 
finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original evolutionary intent, and the 
latter thinks that superfluous.”108 Justice Scalia’s approach in Burnham, however, does not 
 
105 See, e,g., GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 4-85 (1957).   
On the Framers’ understanding of the importance of maritime commerce and transportation, see William R. 
Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
117 (1993).  As we have seen, in the nineteenth century a judicial seizure of property was thought to be 
essential to jurisdiction since a seizure was thought highly likely to be brought to the attention of the property’s 
owner, who would also understand that he needed to appear before the court that had custody of the property 
if he was to obtain its return.  See text at notes 82-83, supra.
106 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion). 
107 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884). 
108 Scalia, supra note 5, at 862.   For a somewhat more detailed explanation as to why such an 
approach does not qualify as originalist, see Laurence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1252-
61 (1993).  For the same reasons, the one effort to date to provide an originalist account of procedural due 
process is not really originalist.  In his article, Edward Eberle concluded that pre-ratification case law had 
established that “[d]ue process guaranteed notice, and opportunity to be heard, and a determination by a 
neutral decisionmaker according to some fair and settled course of judicial proceeding.”  Eberle, supra note 41, 
at 339.  This formulation, however, articulates a standard so general that it articulates no meaningful difference 
from an ahistorical evolutionary jurisprudence tied to nothing more than an abstract notion of procedural 
fairness, since it leaves a judge free to decide what constitutes fair notice, opportunity to be heard, and fair 
adjudicative procedures without regard to those procedural rights extant at the time of the framing.  For a 
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qualify as originalist on this view – once the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” used to evaluate procedural innovation are no longer linked to those rights 
recognized at the time of framing, due process is not linked to history, but rather to the 
judge’s subjective sense of fairness.  Thus, as applied to procedural innovation, the one-way 
ratchet does not use history to constrain judicial decisionmaking.  It is evolutionary, and 
Justice Scalia, as we have seen, strenuously argues that evolutionary jurisprudence cannot be 
originalist.   
But perhaps it is unfair to accuse originalism have lacking a persuasive account of 
procedural due process based on the work of Justice Scalia.  Justice Scalia admits that 
consequentialism infects his jurisprudence; he acknowledges that “in a crunch I may prove a 
faint-hearted originalist.”109 Or, Justice Scalia’s acceptance of International Shoe may reflect no 
more than his deference to the precedential force of nonoriginalist decisions.110 But the 
question remains – is there a persuasive originalist account of procedural due process, and, if 
so, must it forbid procedural innovation?  Or does due-process originalism demand that we 
 
useful elaboration on the difficulties originalism faces in defining original meaning at an appropriate level of 
generality, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31-64 (1991). 
Christopher Eisengruber has demonstrated originalism merges with nonoriginalist decisionmaking if the 
original understanding is defined at such a high level of generality: 
 
Suppose that Grandpa is on his deathbed, and he whispers to Sonny, “Just promise me this, Sonny: 
eat healthy food.”  Sonny, eager to grant this modest request, makes the promise.  Grandpa dies, 
confidently believing (as Sonny well knows) that raw fish and red wine are bad for you and that whole 
milk is good for you.  Now suppose that Sonny becomes convinced, on the basis of subsequent 
scientific studies, that sushi and Chianti are part of a healthy diet but whole milk is not.  We can argue, 
I suppose, about whether Sonny, if he wishes to honor his promise, should refuse to eat sushi.  But 
we should in any case be able to agree that the concept of healthy does not become meaningless if 
divorced from Grandpa’s outdated beliefs about what is healthy.  If Sonny decides to eat sushi, he will 
still b e acting on the basis of a promise to eat healthy food.  It would be wrong to say that Sonny had 
substituted a different promise, such as a promise to only eat delicious food or expensive food. 
 
EISENGRUBER, supra note 28, at 29.  Ronald Dworkin had advanced a similar argument.  See DWORKIN, supra 
note 28, at 291-94. 
109 Scalia, supra note 5, at 864. 
110 See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 138-40.  For a 
leading discussion of originalism’s view on adherence to nonoriginalist precedent, see Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988). 
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return to Pennoyer v. Neff and the balance of nineteenth-century procedural thinking?  It is to 
these matters that I now turn. 
III. THE NONORIGINAL ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE 
 
It remains to develop an account of the original meaning of the Due Process Clause.  
That account suggests that the due process was intended to be an evolving concept rather 
than one with a fixed and historically-determined meaning.   But before I offer that account, 
I consider another that attempts to solve the dilemmas that procedural innovation poses for 
originalism.   
A.  The Original Understanding of Due Process. 
Raoul Berger has advanced an originalist account of due process that would permit 
procedural innovation.  While not addressing procedural due process in terms, Berger argues 
that the original meaning of due process was simply that deprivations of life, liberty or 
property, must be authorized by the common law or statute.111 On this view, procedural 
innovation is permissible as long as it is authorized by statute.  In fact, history thoroughly 
 
111 See BERGER, supra note 15, at 193-214.  For a more recent restatement of this view, see Andrew 
T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due”, 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 10-23 (2005).  Justice Thomas has come close to 
endorsing this position.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 589 (2004) (dissenting opinion).   This was 
Justice Black’s view, although he believed that the Due Process Clause also incorporated the Bill of Rights.  See 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378-84 (1971) (dissenting opinion).   Among contemporary scholars, there 
considerable support for the view that incorporation was intended under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 181-230 (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-130 (1986); Richard L. Aynes, Refined Incorporation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1999); but due-process incorporation has never found support among 
legal scholars and the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause remains contested.  See, e.g., Bret Boyce, 
Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 987-1026 (1998).  The fundamental 
problem with Justice Black’s view of incorporation is textual.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause tracks that of the Fifth Amendment, but on Justice Black’s view, the former clause takes on a totally 
different meaning than the latter with no apparent textual support.  See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63-
66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  The Court has ultimately taken the view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are thought to be 
fundamental, but it has made no attempt to justify that view in terms of the original meaning of due process.  
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965); Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4-11 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-44 (1963); Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897).  
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undermines Berger’s position.  The historical evidence against Berger, moreover, suggests a 
quite different originalist account of due process. 
1.  The Fifth Amendment – Evidence of the understanding of those who crafted the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is surprisingly slim.112 The Due Process Clause was 
ratified in the form proposed by James Madison but neither Madison nor anyone else 
involved in the process made any substantive comments about its meaning.113 Given the 
paucity of evidence of the original understanding, Berger was forced to rely on remarks of 
Alexander Hamilton to the New York legislature some three years before the Due Process 
Clause was presented to Congress.114 Citing Lord Coke, Hamilton argued that “[t]he words 
‘due process’ have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and 
proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of legislature.”115 
When placed in context, however, Hamilton’s remarks are far from supportive of Berger’s 
position.  This statement appears in the course of an argument that proposed legislation 
barring former privateers from holding public office violated the due process clause in New 
York’s bill of rights on the ground that due process requires the legislature to proceed by 
judicial process when imposing this type of disability.116 In context, accordingly, Hamilton 
 
112 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides:  “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . .  . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.    
113 See NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND 
ORIGINS 337-48 (1997). 
114 See BERGER, supra note 15, at 194.  Berger is not the only one to seize on Hamilton’s remarks.  
Many eminent scholars have invoked Hamilton on this score, perhaps demonstrating the remarkable paucity of 
contemporaneous evidence.  See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1103-04 (1953); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early 
Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1437 (1999). 
115 Alexander Hamilton, New York Assembly: Remarks on an Act Regulating Elections (Feb. 6, 1787), in 4 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962).   
116 The context is as follows: 
 
Some gentlemen hold that the law of the land will include an act of the legislature.  But Lord Coke, 
that great luminary of the law, in his comment upon a similar clause, in Magna Charta, interprets the 
law of the land to mean presentment and indictment, and process of outlawry, as contradistinguished 
from trial by jury.  But if there were any doubt upon the constitution, the bill of rights enacted this 
very session removes it.  It is there declared that, no man shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any 
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was claiming that due process is a constraint on legislative power.117 To be sure, Hamilton’s 
argument is confusing.  If Hamilton meant that legislatures have no power to define the 
rights or privileges of individuals, he was asserting a position that Coke never took; and if he 
meant only that due process includes a prohibition on legislatively imposed punishments 
akin to Bills of Attainder, then Hamilton’s conception of due process was different than 
subsequently expressed in the federal constitution, which treated with due process and bills 
of attainder separately.118 Thus, Hamilton’s remarks are an unsteady reed on which to 
premise an original understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 119 
What is more, it is far from clear that Hamilton correctly described Coke’s views.  
Coke apparently equated due process with Magna Carta’s prohibition on the deprivation of 
liberty or property except by a jury’s verdict or the “law of the land”120 His well-known 
treatise explained:  
 
right, but by due process of law, or the judgment of his peers.  The words “due process” have a precise and 
technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they 
can never be referred to an act of legislature. 
 
Are we willing then to endure the inconsistency of passing a bill of rights, and committing a 
direct violation of it in the same session?  In short, are we ready to destroy its foundations at the 
moment they are laid? 
 
Id. at 35-36 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).  
117 See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 989-90.   
118 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
119 Reliance on Hamilton’s comments is additionally perilous because he was speaking of the due 
process clause in New York’s recently enacted bill of rights, and the differences in the subsequently enacted 
federal Bill of Rights are, for present purposes, of some consequence.  For example, Hamilton relied on Coke 
to claim that due process was equivalent to the provision in Magna Carta prohibiting any deprivation of rights 
except “by the law of the land,” which “mean[s] presentment and indictment, and process of outlawry, as 
contradistinguished from trial by jury.”  Hamilton, supra note 115, at 35.  Accord Alexander Hamilton, A Letter 
from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1-27, 1784), reprinted in 3 id. at 485.  The federal Bill of 
Rights, however, contained separate Due Process and Grand Jury Clauses, suggesting that the Fifth 
Amendment’s conception of due process was different from Coke’s.  The Supreme Court made this point in 
the course of holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not require that criminal 
charges by brought by a grand jury.  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884).   
120 Article 39 of Magna Carta provided:   “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, or disseised 
or outlawed or in any way victimised, neither will we attack him or send anyone to attack him, except by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”  RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA, App. 231 (Harry 
Rothwell trans., 2003). 
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For the truest sense and exposition of these words, see the Statute of 37 E. 3. cap 8. 
where the words, by the words, by the law of the land, are rendred, without due 
proces of law, for there it is said, though it be contained in the great Charter, that no 
man be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold without proces of the law; that 
is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawfull men, where such deeds be done 
in due manner, or by writ originall of the Common Law.  Without being brought in 
to answere but by due process of the common law.  No man being put to answer 
without presentment before Justices, or thing of record, or by due process, or by writ 
original, according to the law of the land.121 
This passage, however, is ambiguous about whether a statute inconsistent with what were 
thought to be common-law procedural rights was valid.  If anything, Coke’s view was likely 
that such a statute was invalid.  Sitting as a judge in Bonham’s Case,122 Coke wrote of a statute 
that authorized the Royal College of Physicians to fine and imprison persons practicing 
medicine without a license while granting it a share of all fines it imposed, “when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, the common law will . . . adjudge such at to 
be void.”123 Based on this and similar evidence, a number of scholars have argued that Coke 
was understood in colonial America to endorse judicial review of statutes that infringed 
upon rights recognized at common law.124 In contrast, Blackstone’s famous treatise was 
clearer in expressing the view that a deprivation of life, liberty or property was permissible 
when authorized by either the common law or statute, but Blackstone never equated “due 
 
121 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (1671).  
This passage makes it plain that whatever else it meant, due process regulated the manner in which a defendant 
was haled into court.  For an account of the historical evidence on just this point, see Keith Jurow, Untimely 
Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEG. HISTORY 265 (1975).  Thus, Pennoyer 
was quite correct to read the Due Process Clause as regulating the permissible methods of service. 
122 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (C.P. 1610).   
123 Id. at 652.  
124 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40-57, 72-89 (1928); Riggs, supra note 117, at 958-73.  Even opponents of a reading of 
Coke’s conception of due process as embracing substantive rights acknowledge that the framers may have 
understood Coke differently.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 
96.  On the influence of Coke on American legal thinking at the time of the framing of the Fifth Amendment, 
see, e.g., A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CHARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA 117-25 (1968); RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 87-90 (1926) (1973).   
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process” with Magna Carta’s “law of the land.”125 Hence, the probative value of 
Blackstone’s account for understanding the meaning of due process is uncertain.   
The most influential treatises of the 1820s and 1830s described due process as “the 
right to trial according to the process and proceedings of the common law.” 126 This 
formulation preserves the ambiguity of Coke’s explication and accordingly tells us little 
about the force of Berger’s account.  In what remains the most comprehensive survey of the 
evidence of the original meaning of due process, Rodney Mott argued that the American 
colonists understood Coke and Blackstone to have offered competing accounts, and as they 
came to believe that Parliament had infringed upon what they thought to be their rights as 
Englishmen, Coke’s account of the substantive limitations on legislation became ascendant 
in the years leading to the Revolution.127 Mott himself punted on the original meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause:  “It is evident that the colonists looked on due 
process of law as a guarantee which had a wide, varied, and indefinite content.”128 
It is hard not to sympathize with Mott.  Drawing reliable conclusions about the 
original meaning of the Fifth Amendment is particularly difficult because Madison employed 
a textual formulation – due process of law – that was relatively novel and had heretofore 
received no well-settled judicial construction.  As one leading historian observed:  “No state . 
. . had a due process of law clause in its own constitution, and only New York had 
 
125 See 1 BLACKSTONE, note 76, at 30-34.  On the influence of Blackstone in America in the late 
eighteenth century, see, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM 49-57 (2000); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of 
Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (`976). 
126 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1789 at 
567 (1833) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1994) (footnote omitted).  Accord II JAMES W. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 13-14 (1826) (O.W. Holmes ed., 1873). 
127 See MOTT, supra note 121, at 46-70, 125-39.  For a more recent statement of this view, see Riggs, 
supra note 116, at 963-76.  
128 MOTT, supra note 121, at 123.  
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recommended such a clause in favor of the more familiar ‘law of the land’ clause.”129 It may 
well be that Berger, on balance, has the better argument.  Bonham’s Case had produced no 
progeny and English courts since then had treated Parliament as the supreme authority on 
the constitutionality of legislation.130 But for that reason, English common law offered no 
reliable guideposts for assessing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
in a system with a written constitution which was to be treated as “the supreme law of the 
land.”131 As for New York’s bill of rights, the most direct antecedent of the Fifth 
 
129 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 248 (1999).   Although it cited no historical 
support for its position, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Development Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855), the 
Supreme Court attempted to explain Madison’s choice: 
 
The constitution of the United States, as adopted contained the provision, that ‘the trial of 
all crimes, except in the case of impeachment, shall be by jury.’  When the fifth article of amendment 
containing the words now in question was made, the trial by jury in criminal cases had thus already 
been provided for.  By the sixth and seventh articles of amendment, further special provisions were 
separately made for that mode of trial in civil and criminal cases.  To have followed, as in the state 
constitutions, and in the ordinance of 1787, the words of Magna Charta, and declared that no person 
shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the 
land, would have been in part superfluous and inappropriate.  To have taken the clause, ‘law of the 
land,’ without its immediate context, might possibly have given rise to doubts, which would be 
effectively dispelled by using those words which the great commentator of Magna Charta had 
declared to be the true meaning of the phrase, ‘law of the land,’ in that instrument, and which were 
undoubtedly then received in their true meaning. 
 
Id. at 276.  There is a good deal of question-begging going on here.  Nothing compelled the Framers to 
separate the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments.  Had they wished to track Magna Carta, they could have 
simply combined all three protections into the familiar “judgment of his peers or the law of the land” 
formulation used in Magna Carta.  A bit more plausibly, Charles Miller has suggested that Madison employed 
the due-process formulation because a law-of-the-land clause was already in the Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, and its repetition might have caused confusion.  See Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process Law: The 
American Constitutional Tradition, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 11-12 (J. Roland Pennock and John Chapman 
eds., 1977).  This explanation, however, overlooks the fact that the due-process formulation was borrowed 
from New York’s bill of rights, which was drafted prior to the federal constitution, and New York’s rationale 
for adopting this formulation is entirely mysterious.  See Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 96-97. 
130 See CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 32-48, 106-07 (1930); 
David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L LAW 863, 888-90 (2003). Berger stressed this point.  See Raoul Berger, “”Law of the Land” 
Reconsidered, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 5-6, 29-30 (1979).  In fact, it is not even clear that Coke held the statute at 
issue in Bonham’s Case invalid; the best reading of his opinion may be merely that the statute should be narrowly 
construed.  See Jenkins, supra, at 884-88.  Nor did the 1354 statute that Coke invoked in his treatise as equating 
the law of the land guarantee with due process produce and reliable guideposts for assessing the meaning of 
due process; as Keith Jurow has demonstrated, its language and construction makes plain that it was limited to 
assessing the manner in which a defendant could be haled into court.  See Jurow, supra note 121, at 266-71. 
131 U.S. CONST art. VI, cl. 2.  
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Amendment, it was far from clearly understood, at least if Alexander Hamilton’s views are 
any guide. 
2.  The Fourteenth Amendment – Even if Berger’s account accurately described the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it becomes far more doubtful as an account of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s parallel provision. 
As with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the debates in Congress and 
the ratifying states over the Fourteenth Amendment offer no meaningful discussion of the 
meaning of due process.132 The debates, however, make clear the reason for this omission – 
it was generally understood that the courts had already articulated the parameters of due 
process.  Representative John Bingham, presenting what would become the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the House of Representatives, parried inquiry into the meaning of due 
process thusly:  “[T]he courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go read their 
decisions.”133 Indeed, the advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment consistently argued that 
their proposal did no more than make existing constitutional protections enforceable against 
the states.134 Even aside from this legislative history, an inquiry into the contours of Fifth 
Amendment due process jurisprudence at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification seems inescapable.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was 
framed in terms already found in the Fifth Amendment; accordingly it should have been 
plain that judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s parallel provision would inform 
 
132 See, e.g., HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 95-97, 
140-209 (1908) (2003); MOTT, supra note 121, at 154-59.  For a representative example of the type of unhelpful 
truisms to be found in the congressional debates on those relatively rare occasions on which due process was 
discussed, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 256 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Baker) (emphasis in 
original) (“The Constitution already declares generally that no person shall ‘be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.’  This declares particularly that no State shall do it.”).    
133 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).  On the pivotal role of Bingham in the drafting 
and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, On the Continuing Importance of 
Congressman  John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2003). 
134 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens); id. at 2542 
(remarks of Rep. Bingham); id. at App. 256 (remarks of Rep. Baker); id. at 2765-66 (remarks of Sen. Howard). 
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the construction of the new provision.  But the state of the decisional law at the time of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing provides little support for Berger’s account.   
Prior to 1868, the Supreme Court had addressed the meaning of due process on four 
occasions.  The first was Bank of Columbia v. Okely,135 in which the Court upheld a Maryland 
statute granting the bank a summary remedy on its notes against a due process attack based 
on the Maryland Constitution on the ground that the debtors had waived whatever rights 
they had by agreeing to the terms of the notes.136 Notably, the Court did not suggest that the 
summary remedy was valid because it was authorized by statute; to the contrary, the Court 
characterized due process as “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary powers of 
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive 
justice.”137 
The Court did not treat with the federal due process clause until Bloomer v. 
McQuewan,138 when the Court construed an Act of Congress extending the term of a patent 
as entitling a licensee to continue to use the patented item during the extension without need 
of an additional license.139 In dicta, the Court added, without elaboration:  “The right to 
construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased and paid for without any 
limitation . . . . [a]nd a special Act of Congress, passed afterwards, depriving appellees of 
their right to use them, certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.”140 
Next, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Development Co.,141 the Court upheld a 
federal statute authorizing issuance a lien on the property of federal tax collectors based on 
the results of an administrative audit against due process attack on the ground although the 
 
135 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819).  
136 See id at 244-45.  
137 Id. at 244.  
138 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).  
139 See id. at 550-53.  
140 Id. at 553.  
141 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).  
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statute departed from the traditional requirement common law requirement of a trial and a 
jury determination, it was consistent with longstanding statutory remedies granted against tax 
collectors.142 Thus, the Court implicitly held that the common law incidents of due process 
could be altered through statutory innovation, but it nevertheless characterized the Due 
Process Clause as “a restraint upon the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers 
of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any 
process ‘due process of law’ by its mere will.”143 
Finally, and most famously, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,144 as it rejected the power of 
Congress to prohibit slavery in federal territories, the Court wrote, again without much in 
the way of elaboration:  “[A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States 
of his liberty or property merely because he came himself or brought his property into a 
particular territory of the United States and who committed no offense against the laws 
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.”145 
In sum, by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, the Supreme Court had 
twice expressly rejected the view that due process was inapplicable to statutes, and it had 
 
142 See id at 277-85. 
143 Id. at 276.   As for the methodology to be used when assessing a procedural innovation under due 
process attack, the Court wrote: 
 
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is 
due process?  To this the answer must be twofold.  We must examine the constitution itself, to see 
whether this process is in conflict with any of its provisions.  If not found to be so, we must look to 
those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, 
before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their to 
their own civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this 
country. 
 
Id. at 276-77.  This, of course, comes close to a view of due process as prohibiting procedural innovation.  But 
this discussion in Okely never ripened into a general understanding that due process prohibits procedural 
innovation after the framing, as the discussion below demonstrates. 
144 60 U.S.  (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
145 Id. at 450.  
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implicitly but fairly clearly rejected that view on two other occasions as well.146 Thus, the 
Berger view did not represent the understanding of due process by 1868, at least if the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court are to be taken seriously.147 At the same time, it is 
hard to divine very much about the nature of due process from the four available cases; the 
Court had discussed the concept in only skeletal terms. 
The rather muddled understanding of due process is reflected in Thomas Cooley’s 
treatise, which appeared about the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.148 
Cooley echoed Murray’s Lessee: “[A] legislative enactment is not necessarily the law of the 
land . . . .  That construction would render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this 
 
146 It is perhaps curious that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would incorporate into that 
amendment the very clause that had been at the root of Dred Scott, but the anomaly disappears when one 
considers that due process was a popular concept among abolitionists.  Prior to the Civil War, abolitionists had 
argued that slavery was itself a deprivation of the liberty of slaves and without due process of law, and therefore 
inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 111, at 42-56; HOWARD J. GRAHAM,
EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE “CONSPIRACY 
THEORY,” AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 252-58 (1968); JACOBIOUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW:
THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 43-56 (1951) (1965).  See generally ERIC 
FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL 
WAR 73-102 (1970).   
147 Professor Harrison, in the course of the debate over substantive due process, disparages the 
significance of the antebellum Supreme Court decisions on due process: 
 
As of 1868, the Supreme Court’s most important discussion of due process had appeared in a 
procedural case, Murray’s Lessee, and the Court’s most famous venture into vested rights due process, 
Dred Scott, was loathed by the political party that was about to amend the Constitution . . . .  
Republicans no longer had any need to profess what may have been a forced belief that the Fifth 
Amendment outlawed slavery in the territories. 
 
John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 554-55 (1997).  Professor 
Harrison, however, uncharacteristically identifies no evidence to support his surmise about the motives of the 
post-war Republicans who were behind the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, even if the 
Republicans were ready to disavow their enthusiasm for due process after slavery had been abolished, they 
picked a strange way of doing so – utilizing in the Fourteenth Amendment the precise language that had been 
construed to grant substantive rights against what was thought to be legislative overreaching in Dred Scott. The 
more reasonable surmise, in my view, is that Republicans were content to grant the newly freed slaves the due 
process protections that had once been reserved for whites.  Certainly that view is more faithful to an 
originalism that rejects reliance on motives and instead stresses the original public meaning of constitutional 
text.  
148 On the importance of the Cooley treatise, see, e.g., EDWIN CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST 
GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING, AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JURIDICIAL CONCEPT 116-18 (1948); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 628; CLYDE JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 27-32 (1954); BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LASSEZ FAIRE CAME TO 
THE SUPREME COURT 18-41 (1942). 
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part of the Constitution into mere nonsense.”149 Instead, due process “exclude[s] arbitrary 
power from every branch of the government; and there would be no exclusion if such 
receipts or decrees were to take effect in the form of a statute.”150 As to procedural 
innovation, Cooley explained that the legislature could deprive an individual of what was 
thought to be a “vested right,” adding that “a vested right of action is property in the same 
sense in which tangible items are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary 
interference.”151 Nevertheless, Cooley cautioned that there was no vested right to any 
particular remedy,152 to the existing rules of evidence,153 or, more generally, “to an anticipated 
continuance of the present general laws . . . .”154 He added that a vested right  
rests upon equities, it has reasonable limits and restrictions; it must have some regard 
to the general welfare and public policy; it cannot be a right which is to be examined, 
settled, and defended on a distinct and separate consideration of the individual case, 
but rather on broad and general grounds, which embrace the welfare of the whole 
community, and which seek the equal and impartial protection of the interests of 
all.155 
While some scholars claim that Cooley unambiguously endorsed a broad view of substantive 
due process,156 one is hard-pressed to find such clarity his treatise.  Cooley is actually quite 
elusive on what constitutes a vested right; about the only clear point he makes is that 
retroactive legislation will frequently impair vested rights, although even in that context 
Cooley’s discussion is rife with qualifications. 157 Still, Cooley’s account makes plain that at 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing, due process was considered fully 
 
149 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 433 (1868) (1998) (quoting Taylor v. Porter, 4 
Hill 140, 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)). 
150 Id. at 484 (footnote omitted) (quoting Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg. 171, 173 (Pa. 1843)).  
151 Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).  
152 See  id. at 443-45 
153 See  id. at 452-55. 
154 Id. at 440.  
155 Id. at 438 (footnote omitted).  
156 See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due 
Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 342-45 (1999).  
157 See id. at 455-73.  
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applicable to the legislature.  It makes equally clear that due process imposed no general 
prohibition against procedural innovation, but it did not quite give legislatures an entirely 
free hand either. Moreover, we have seen that the concept of due process, from Magna 
Carta onward, had posed no obstacle to procedural innovation, which had continued apace 
through the framing of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.158 
C.  A Nonoriginalism For Originalists.159 
By now, it should be plain that ascertaining the original meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is a tricky business.  Scholars have not come close to any 
type of consensus about whether the original understanding of due process limited legislative 
authority.160 Berger’s account seems an unlikely candidate for the original understanding; 
even if accurate in 1791, the antebellum precedents make plain that it was decidedly out of 
favor by 1868.  But the antebellum precedents substituted nothing very clear for the English 
view of due process as inapplicable to legislation.  A “frozen in amber” view is even more 
implausible.  It is unsupported by the constitutional text, and at odds with both the tradition 
of procedural reform that predated the framing of both provisions and with Cooley’s 
account, which permits, at least to some extent, procedural innovation. 161 To be sure, the 
antebellum Supreme Court decisions had seen to show special solicitude for property 
interests, but the Court had not yet been called upon to defined the scope of constitutionally 
protected “liberty,” and the constitutional text suggests that “life” and “liberty” are no less 
 
158 See text at notes 42-43, supra.
159 Cf. Barnett, supra note 13, at 611(title).     
160 Compare, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 272 (1985) (no limitation on legislature); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-
21 (1980) (same); Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 95-100 (same), Harrison, supra note 147, at 542-54 (same) with 
2 CROSSKEY, supra note 114, at 1102-10 (due process limited legislative power); Douglas Laycock, Due Process 
and Separation of Powers: The Effort To Make the Due Process Clause Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 890-96 (1982) 
(same); Riggs, supra note 117, at 991-1004 (same); Miller, supra note 129, at 4-17 (same); Christopher Wolfe, The 
Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING 220-28 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (same) [hereafter cited as “THE BILL OF RIGHTS”]. 
161 See text at notes 147-57, supra.
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entitled to constitutional solicitude than is “property.”  Moreover, the antebellum Supreme 
Court cases where themselves inconsistent.   Murray’s Lessee had suggested that there would 
be special constitutional solicitude for legislatively endorsed innovation, at least when it 
reflected the law of England,162 but the dicta in Bloomer v. McQuewan suggested that legislative 
innovation could run afoul of due process,163and in Dred Scott the Court held that legislation 
prohibiting slavery in federal territories violated due process, despite a long history of such 
legislation in both Britain and this country.164 Thus, no clear approach emerges from the 
antebellum cases.  The unfortunate trust is that there just was not a lot of original meaning 
to be found in the two Due Process Clauses.  The concept of due process was amorphous 
and undeveloped until well after both clauses had been adopted.  Even if Berger was right 
that there was a clear original understanding in 1791, by 1868 the Supreme Court had 
discarded it, while putting nothing readily definable in its place. 
One point, however, surely comes clear from the antebellum Supreme Court cases 
and Cooley’s account – the Due Process Clause made it the responsibility of the courts to 
assess the propriety of the manner in which persons are deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
whether by statutory or common law procedures.  Despite the vagueness of the standards to 
be derived from the extant precedents, it is quite clear that Bingham and the other Framers 
made no attempt to create their own definition of due process.  Instead, the framers relied 
on the then-extant constitutional common law, unsatisfactory though it was. 165 Moreover, in 
 
162 See text and note at note 143, supra. 
163 See text at note 140, supra.
164 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 534-40 (McLean, J., dissenting).   See also id. at 605-28 (Curtis, J., 
dissenting). 
165 As one leading historian of the Fourteenth Amendment put it: 
 
[I]t seems reasonable under the circumstances that the Thirty-ninth Congress, even as the First 
Congress before it, realized that they did not know just what due process meant; it being a technical 
matter of legal interpretation, they preferred to leave it to the decisions of the courts.  In this way the 
members of Congress, knowing that there was a body of technical rules built up around the idea of 
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light of the primitive state of due process jurisprudence in 1868, surely the Framers could 
not have doubted that due process jurisprudence would continue to evolve by common law 
methods.166 What is more, the Framers knew that this process of common law 
constitutional adjudication would continue since the federal courts would inevitably 
elaborate upon the newly crafted Due Process Clause under their power to hear “all cases, in 
law or equity, arising under this Constitution . . . .”167 Indeed, we know from Federalist 78 
that it was the general expectation that the judiciary would operate as a countermajoritarian 
guarantor of the individual rights identified in the Constitution.168 
On this view, the purpose of the due process guarantee was to ensure that legislative 
majorities did not have unfettered power to determine the manner in which persons could 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property.  When such deprivations were at stake, due process 
ensured that a countermajoritarian institution would exercise review.  To apply the concept 
 
“due process of law” and considering it to be a most valuable protection of the general rights of the 
people, decided to incorporate it into the fundamental law as a limitation on the power of the states 
and leave its ultimate definition and application to the future adjudication of the courts. 
 
MOTT, supra note 121, at 165. 
166 The very amorphousness of due process in 1868 suggests a different kind of originalist critique of 
the position advanced here.  Judge Bork has argued that the judiciary may only properly enforce those original 
meanings for which there is reliable evidence of agreement at the time of ratification, and accordingly, if there 
is no reasonably ascertainable original meaning of a constitutional provision, it cannot be enforced.  See BORK,
supra note 1, at 166.  It is a strange sort of fidelity to original meaning, however, to claim that a constitutional 
provision that the Framers intended to have meaning instead be treated as surplusage.  Even more important, 
Judge Bork ignores the possibility that for open-ended provisions such as the Due Process Clause, there may 
have been agreement that a countermajoritarian judiciary be permitted to develop the meaning of the 
constitutional provision through common law adjudication. 
167 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.   For a survey of the evidence that the framers of the original 
constitution envisioned its elaboration through a process of common law adjudication, see Powell, supra note 
17, at 903-13. 
168 In particular, I refer to Federalist 78’s defense of judicial tenure: 
 
This independent of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights 
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence 
of conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they 
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the 
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community. 
 
THE FEDERALIST, No. 28, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).  
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of due process courts would be required to develop a substantive account of the permissible 
methods by which majoritarian institutions may authorize the deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property, but their review would ensure that life, liberty, or property have some normative 
protection over and above that available by the grace of legislative majorities.  This account 
is explicitly countermajoritarian; but surely countermajoritarianism is the essential nature of 
any Bill of Rights.  That point is itself originalist; as James Madison explained as he put 
before the House of Representatives what became the Bill of Rights: 
[T]he presumption in favor of liberty ought to be leveled against that quarter where 
the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative [sic] of
power.  But this is not found in either the executive or legislative departments of the 
government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the 
minority.169 
Madison added that were a Bill of Rights 
incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or 
executive; they will naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.170 
Madison’s own account of the Bill of Rights accordingly rejects majoritarianism, and 
critically depends upon the judiciary to make the countermajoritarian guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights effective. 
Thus, the account I offer identifies the original meaning of due process as 
nonoriginalist and countermajoritarian.  On this view the function of the Due Process 
Clause was not to enshrine a fixed original understanding as organic law – the meaning of 
due process at the time of the framing was too amorphous to support that view – but 
 
169 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 437 (Joseph Gales ed., June 8, 1789), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 
113, at 54.  
170 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457 (Joseph Gales ed., June 8, 1789), reprinted in COGAN, supra note 
113, at 56.  
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instead to delegate to the judiciary responsibility for countermajoritarian oversight.   For this 
reason, the nonoriginalist conception of due process revels in countermajoritarianism.171 
To be sure, the case for an original understanding of procedural due process as 
evolutionary and countermajoritarian is inferential and speculative.  Neither Bingham nor 
any of the other proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment ever explicitly argued for an 
evolutionary common-law conception of due process.  Of course, it might have been 
political dynamite to explicitly acknowledge that the Due Process Clause would grant the 
judiciary potentially broad authority in an ill-defined area of constitutional law.172 But an 
evolutionary common-law conception of due process is consistent with the evolutionary 
nature of procedure up until the adoption of the Due Process Clause, as well as the tradition 
of common law constitutional adjudication that had taken firm root by 1868.173 
In contrast, I know of no evidence that the Due Process Clause was intended to 
freeze procedure in amber – that view is unsupported by the text and can be found nowhere 
in the congressional or ratification debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-ratification 
precedents, or  by Cooley or other eighteenth-century commentators.   Similarly, the 
historical evidence does not identify any type of original standard by which procedural 
 
171 It follows that I share Barry Friedman’s misgivings about the “academic obsession” with what is 
thought to be the “countermajoritarian dilemma” posed by constitutional adjudication.  See Barry Friedman, 
The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The Countermajoritarian Dilemma, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). One can 
debate the merits of countermajoritarianism as a normative matter, but as a formalist matter, it seems to me 
indisputable that countermajoritarianism is embedded in the Constitution.  The concerns about 
countermajoritarian review, in my judgment, are best addressed through a series of prudential considerations 
governing judicial review discussed in Part III below. 
172 Bingham’s earlier proposal for a fourteenth amendment that would grant Congress the power to 
enact all laws “necessary and proper” to secure the privileges and immunities of citizenship and equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property  had been defeated because it was thought to grant 
Congress too much authority to interfere with existing state law, and that defeat had induced considerable 
caution on the part of Bingham and the other advocates of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., EARL M. 
MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 63-69 (2003). 
173 The account of procedural due process advanced here accordingly complements the account of 
common law evolution of constitutional law provided by David Strauss, although I approached the matter 
from the standpoint of original meaning.  See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Adjudication, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
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innovation could be judged – that matter was left for future adjudication.  Though the case 
presented here may not be unassailable, there is no other originalist account of procedural 
due process that can boast of even this much originalist support. 
This account has implications for substantive due process as well.174 If the original 
understanding of the Due Process Clause permitted the courts to take an evolutionary 
common-law approach when reviewing procedural legislation, then it is hard to understand 
why the same approach should not be used for purposes of defining those substantive rights 
granted by due process. After all, the substantive rights secured by due process were no 
better developed than its procedural component at the time of the framing; they had been 
outlined in only the barest way in Bloomer and Dred Scott. And we have seen that Cooley’s 
treatise, while perceiving no vested right in the continuation of present law, acknowledged 
rather ill-defined substantive rights protected by due process. Moreover, if the concept of 
due process was intended to evolve through common law adjudication, surely that was 
equally true for its procedural and substantive components.175 
174 Indeed, the antebellum Supreme Court cases offer no distinction between procedural and 
substantive due process.  This dichotomy appears to have been invented long after 1868.  For the first mention 
of “procedural due process” in United States Supreme Reports, see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 
(1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting).   For the first mention of “substantive due process,” see Republic Natural Gas 
Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
175 The advocates of a robust doctrine of substantive due process have relied on the evidence by 
1868, due process was understood to limit legislative power and offer substantive protections to support their 
own claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original understanding included robust protection against a wide 
array of government regulation.  See, e.g., Ely, supra note 156, at 344-45; Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th 
Anniversary of Lochner V. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 477-88 (2005); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era 
Jurisprudence and American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).  To my eye, these scholars are doing 
quite a bit of cherry-picking of the evidence to claim that there was a settled understanding of a broad 
substantive due process protection against government regulation by 1868.  In the lower courts, there had been 
a smattering of cases construing state constitutional due process clauses to protect substantive rights, but far 
more state courts had rejected that view.  See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 124, at 89-115; HAINES, supra note 130, 
at 104-16.  Compare, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (recognizing substantive limitations on 
legislative power under the state’s due process clause) with State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497 (1858) (rejecting 
substantive due process).   The Supreme Court had yet to address this dispute; the closest it came to embracing 
substantive due process was in Dred Scott, and it is difficult to disentangle the due process holding in that case 
from the Court’s holdings that African-Americans had not rights that could be protected by the federal courts, 
see 60 U.S. at 403-06, and that Congress had no authority to regulate slavery in the territories, see  id. at 446 – 
conclusions that were repudiated with the ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
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Indeed, the original meaning of much of the Constitution may be nonoriginalist.  To 
take two examples from the Bill of Rights, there is extremely limited contemporaneous 
evidence about the Framers’ understandings of the First and Fourth Amendments.  As to 
the former, Congress rejected a version of the First Amendment that would have 
incorporated the common law, and framed a novel text while doing little to explicate its 
meaning.176 As to the latter, the law of torts had traditionally regulated search and seizure, 
but the Framers adopted a new formulation – a requirement of probable cause for warrants 
and a prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure – that had no common-law 
antecedents and that was, again, ratified with little in the way of explication.177 The original 
understanding of these provisions therefore likely would have included an expectation that 
these relatively abstract and novel formulations would be developed through common law 
adjudication by a countermajoritarian institution. When a heretofore largely unknown legal 
concept winds up in a written constitution accompanied by limited explication of its public 
meaning, against a background of common-law construction by a countermajoritarian 
institution, the original understanding, I submit, is largely nonoriginalist, with the text 
supplying only the most general parameters for decisionmaking. 
IV. NONORIGINALISM AND THE PRUDENTIAL VIRTUES 
 
Certainly nothing in Dred Scott spoke in any straightforward way to the scope of congressional power to regulate 
interstate commerce, much less state and local regulatory and police powers, which were not at issue in that 
case.   Moreover, there was a long tradition of pervasive regulation in antebellum America, and there is 
precious little evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to alter that tradition.  See, e.g.,
WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
51-233 (1996).  
` 176 See, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 160, at 82-93.  As it happens, although Robert Bork originally articulated his conception of 
originalism in the context of the First Amendment, even he acknowledged that the Framers “seem to have had 
no coherent theory of free speech,” and thus “[w]e are . . . forced to construct our own theory of the 
constitutional protection of speech.”  Bork, supra note 15, at 22.  Even Judge Bork’s admirers are unable to 
identify historical evidence to support his account of the original understanding of the First Amendment.  See,
e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 299, 307-08 (1978). 
177 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 
(2000). 
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The preceding discussion has answered much but not all of the case for public-
meaning originalism.  Perhaps the most powerful argument remains – the claim that 
nonoriginalism is an invitation to judges to read their policy preferences into the law.178 
After all, the understanding of due process advanced here, although consistent with the 
minimal standards for due process that had been articulated as of 1868, leaves a wide swath 
for judicial discretion.  A nonoriginalist and countermajoritarian conception of due process 
requires the courts to develop a substantive theory to identify those questions that should 
not be left to majoritarian determination, and therefore grants the judiciary potentially vast 
authority.  Still, as Professor Sager has taught us, the institutional limitations on the judiciary 
frequently cause it to “fail[] to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual 
boundaries.”179 That concept has particular utility for present purposes. 
One need not be an originalist to see reason to circumscribe the scope of judicial 
review.  Courts necessarily make decisions based on the limited information placed before 
them by the parties consistent with the constraints imposed by the rules of evidence; their 
conclusions on empirical questions are necessarily tentative and fraught with uncertainty; 
their ability to recognize and correct errors is limited by the doctrine of stare decisis;  and all 
of this suggests that on any number of issues, judicial decisionmaking is likely to be inferior 
to that of majoritarian institutions.180 Consider, for example, the asserted due process right 
 
178 See text at notes 20-22, supra.
179 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).  See also LAWRENCE GENE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 86-128 (2004).  This thesis enjoys considerable support among legal 
scholars.  See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 28, at 31-34; Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1524, 1594-96 (2000); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equibrilation, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 866-69 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties by Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467-73 (2000); Stephen F. Ross, 
Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321-24 (1987). 
180 As the Court has put it:  “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention 
is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we think a political branch has acted.”  FCC v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).   For an 
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of terminally ill patients to physician-assisted suicide at issue in Washington v. Glucksberg.181 A
nonoriginalist will not find the common law’s failure to recognize a right of terminally ill 
patients to assisted suicide dispositive, but even a judge whose theory of 
countermajoritarianism inclines her toward libertarianism respectful of an autonomous 
doctor-patient relationship is not ready to decide the matter.  The judge still must consider 
whether a prophylactic prohibition is justified by the risks that patients suffering from 
terminal illness lack the ability to make fully informed choices, or will yield to pressure from 
friends of family eager to be spared the emotional and financial toll of a long and likely 
terminal illness, as well as the difficulty in designing a regulatory system that can reliably 
prevent such abuses at reasonable cost.182 These are difficult and largely empirical questions 
on which courts, at best, can reach only provisional judgments.  The prudent nonoriginalist 
will surely hesitate before removing this issue from the legislative arena. 
There are any number of nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation that 
acknowledge the institutional strengths of majoritarian decisionmaking and the perils of 
countermajoritarianism.  This point, for example, is central to the view of constitutional 
adjudication as reinforcing democratic deliberation advanced by Justice Breyer,183 the 
utilitarian pragmatism of Judge Posner,184 and the representation-reinforcing theory of John 
Hart Ely.185 It may well be that as theories of constitutional interpretation these approaches 
are wanting; there is little in the constitution’s text or history to suggest that it was intended 
to do any one thing above all others – be it promoting democratic deliberation, social 
 
excellent summary of the advantages of majoritarian institutions and the significant risks of error in judicial 
decisionmaking, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 24-60 (1999).  For a more detailed inquiry, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 153-288 (2006). 
181 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
182 See id. at 782-89 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
183 See BREYER, supra note 28, at 118-32.  
184 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26-37 (1990).  
185 See ELY, supra note 160, at 73-104. 
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welfare, or evenhanded opportunities for political participation.186 But on Professor Sager’s 
view that constitutional adjudication not only concerns the interpretation of text, but also 
the extent to which the judiciary can prudently pursue the norms it derives from text, then 
these approaches have much to commend them.  A judge attentive to these prudential 
virtues, moreover, will see in the occasion of judicial review no license to write his own 
policy preferences into constitutional law.  Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that 
nonoriginalist due process jurisprudence has been attentive to just this concern. 
To take an example related to the parking-ticket context, we have seen that the cost-
benefit approach of Mathews v. Eldridge is thoroughly nonoriginalist – a historically-based 
understanding of due process would not tolerate the gaping exception to the historically 
accepted rule against hearsay that was blessed in that case187 – but it is also the approach least 
likely to inject the judge’s own values into an assessment of constitutional judgments about 
procedure.  An approach that attached some sort of intrinsic value to specified procedural 
safeguards would effectively require the taxpayers to shoulder the cost of those procedural 
safeguards that pricked the Court’s conscience.188 Instead of externalizing the costs of its 
conscience onto the taxpayers, the Court has chosen to require only cost-justified 
investments in procedural regularity – an approach akin to the time-tested Hand formula for 
 
186 For a leading elaboration on this criticism, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).   
187 See Part II.B, supra.
188 Jerry Mashaw, for example, has criticized Eldridge on the ground that when the government fails 
to hear out a claimant, the resulting “lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity 
and self-respect that society properly deems independently valuable.”  Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due 
Process Calculus for Administrative Decisionmaking in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 50 (1976).  See also Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus,
37 Hous. L. Rev. 635, 657-70 (2000).  But imposing a requirement of hearings also diverts scarce resources 
from the provision of government services and renders governmental welfare programs a less efficient means 
of aiding the needy, a result which is also likely to sap political support for such programs.  Mashaw balances 
these competing claims in favor of the provision of evidentiary hearings, but surely he can fairly be accused of 
reading his own policy preferences into the Constitution. 
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negligence transposed to the realm of procedural due process.189 Whatever the criticisms of 
Mathews v. Eldridge, it is difficult to argue that the Court has merely imposed its policy 
preferences on the Due Process Clause.190 
Thus, at least in the due process context, the nonoriginalist answers the charge of 
judicial activism by observing that an overt concern with the virtues of prudence is far more 
likely to discipline judicial decisionmaking that a search for an illusory precision through 
historical inquiry into the original meaning of due process.  When history is as imprecise as 
in the historical meaning of due process, it can little serve to constrain the discretion of 
judges or enforce a principled boundary between the realms of politics and constitutional 
law.191 To be sure, prudence will frequently argue in favor of long-established legal regimes 
because the risks always associated with nonmajoritiarian change, but there will be occasions 
on which a court can satisfy itself that those risks are acceptable.  For example, the Supreme 
Court used the Due Process Clause to revolutionize criminal procedure by imposing an 
 
189 I refer, of course, to Learned Hand’s explication of the tort of negligence as turning on whether 
the cost of the injury multiplied by the likelihood that it would occur exceeds the cost that the defendant would 
have had to incur to avoid the loss.  See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1947).  
See l See United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1947).  The Hand formula reflects 
nearly a consensus view of the outcome of centuries of evolution in the common law of torts  See, e.g., GUIDO 
CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (4th ed. 1992). 
190 For a defense of the much-criticized Eldridge, see Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo 
A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood! Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn 
Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21-24 (2005).   In contrast, in the area of criminal procedure, 
the Court has rejected Eldridge and adopted a test that pays heavy deference to tradition.  See Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 442-46 (1992).  If anything, that approach reflects a good deal more judicial ideology 
because of its conservative bias.  The Court, however, is far from consistent on this point; it used the Due 
Process Clause to impose a duty on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the accused in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and subsequently broadened that duty to require prosecutors to identify and 
disclose exculpatory information in the hands of the police and other investigators, see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 437 (1995), even though historically prosecutors had never been placed under any type of duty of 
disclosure, see LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 283-343; Michael Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 
865-67, 893-99 (1968).  For additional discussion of due process doctrine in the criminal context, see Jerold H. 
Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretative Guidelines, 45 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 303 (2001). 
191 Cf. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning,
52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 217 (2004) (using citation patterns in federalism cases to demonstrate that originalism fails 
to constrain judicial discretion).  
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obligation on prosecutors to identify and disclose exculpatory evidence,192 but no one argues 
that this reform has produced mischief, perhaps because, like Mathews v. Eldridge, it is largely 
directed at producing a more reliable adjudicative process.   More generally, we have seen 
that hostility to procedural innovation is not characteristic of the common law, nor is there 
any evidence that such hostility was at the root of seventeenth or eighteenth-century 
understandings of due process.  And it may well be that in the context of procedural due 
process, relevant judicial expertise is relatively great, in light of the judiciary’s familiarity with 
procedural devices that facilitate adjudicative factfinding, and therefore the counsel of 
prudence argues with somewhat lesser force for judicial restraint than in any number of 
substantive due process contexts that demand what amounts to legislative factfinding, such 
as the asserted right to assisted suicide.193 A jurisprudence that is attentive to the limits of 
judicial expertise, rather than one based on an illusory original meaning, is likely to better 
serve the advocates of judicial restraint. 
* * * * *
I conclude with an admission of failure – I do not claim to have discovered the 
original meaning of due process.  In my view, the historical evidence shows that the original 
understanding of due process was murky and incomplete.  In this, however, I am in good 
company.  Learned Hand wrote that the Due Process Clauses are drawn “in such sweeping 
terms that history does not elucidate their contents.”194 Arthur Sutherland wrote that “no 
one knows precisely what the words ‘due process of law’ meant to the draftsmen of the Fifth 
 
192 See note 190, supra. 
193 For the seminal work articulating the distinction between legislative and adjudicative factfinding, 
see Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 
404-07, 423-25 (1942).   The distinction is widely accepted, although its precise formulation and application is 
debated.  See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social 
Science in the Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482-91 (1986); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of 
Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113-16 (1988). 
194 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30 (1962).  
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Amendment, and no one knows what these words meant to the draftsmen of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”195 Perhaps it is time to give these admissions their due. 
It is well and good to debate the theoretical merits of originalism, but when the 
evidence of original meaning of a particular constitutional text is unsatisfactory, the message 
of history is that the original meaning simply provides no reliable guide for decisionmaking.  
I do not claim that the original meaning of all of the Constitution is indeterminate – but the 
original meaning of the Due Process Clauses certainly is.  An indeterminate original 
meaning, moreover, surely is a greater invitation to judicial subjectivity than an alternative 
interpretative strategy that stresses prudential virtues.  What is more, an indeterminate 
original meaning may well betoken an original understanding that such an indeterminate (but 
perhaps for that reason politically unobjectionable) text would be fleshed out through 
common law adjudication.  Common law adjudication, in turn, is evolutionary in character; 
the common law has never been frozen in amber.  The history of procedure is particularly 
illuminating on this subject – the common law’s history is replete with procedural 
innovation, and it seems highly unlikely that the twin Due Process Clauses were intended to 
bring that evolution to an end.  The lesson of history, I submit, is that the original meaning 
of due process is nonoriginalist. 
 
195 Arthur Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283, 286 (1965)   
